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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the focal actors and their 
heterogeneity in blockchain splits. Disagreements in 
blockchain communities often lead to splits in the 
blockchain and the community. For example, 
disagreements within the Bitcoin community on 
increasing the block size led to the blockchain split and 
creation of Bitcoin Cash. We build on actor-network 
theory to investigate blockchain split as a translation 
process, and employ case study methodology to 
examine Bitcoin splits. We identify several human 
actors, such as miners, developers, merchants, and 
investors, as well as non-human actors including 
ideologies, exchanges and computer programs 
involved in Bitcoin splits. Our results show that actor 
heterogeneity, that is, the complex constellation of 
diverse actors, plays a key role in blockchain splits. We 
further describe how the human and non-human 
actors’ fluid moves into micro and macro positions in 
the network affect the development of the split. We also 
discuss the role of these actors and their engagement 
in forming micro and macro agencies in blockchain 
splits. Our study adds to the understanding of actor 
behavior and network dynamics in decentralized 
information systems such as blockchain and open 
source software. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Blockchain-based services are run in a peer-to-peer 
network of computers without a central authority [39, 
37]. A characteristic feature of blockchain is nodes or 
miners who collectively validate and bundle batches of 
transactions into blocks and add these blocks into a 
chronological chain [37]. Instead of a central server, 
the chain is stored and synchronized on each node in 
the network [39]. Consequently, blockchain-based 
services are not maintained by a central authority, but 
by a community of miners and developers [37]. Thus, 
resolving disagreements within the community 
represents a particular challenge.  
The disagreements within blockchain communities 
often lead to a technical event known as a fork, which 
refers to the divergence of a blockchain into two or 
more potential paths [26]. For example, Bitcoin Cash 
(BCH) was created as a result of a successful fork from 
Bitcoin (BTC) due to the disagreement among the 
communities on increasing the block size. In a similar 
vein, Ethereum was also forked to create two separate 
crypto currencies: Ether (ETH) and Ethereum Classic 
(ETC) after the system was hacked [7]. ArcadeCity, a 
carpooling platform, much like Uber but without a 
central authority, was forked to create Swarm City. In 
essence, a blockchain split is a consequence of a fork, 
which is in turn a consequence of critical incidents 
such as performance issues, catastrophic bugs, and 
cyber attacks [7]. 
Despite the increasing managerial interest in 
applications of blockchain technologies alongside the 
booming cryptocurrency market, academic research 
focusing on blockchain forks is somewhat limited [6, 
23]. While the prior literature has examined open 
source software (OSS) forks [10, 26, 29, 30], we hold 
that for two reasons the findings from those studies are 
not directly applicable to the blockchain context. First, 
the studies are atheoretical and thus of limited value in 
developing theoretically generalizable insights. 
Second, blockchain forks differ from OSS forks, as 
executing a blockchain fork requires attracting miners 
to ensure sufficient computing power in order to make 
the forked blockchain viable. OSS forks can occur 
simply when developers move to supporting a new 
project. Understanding forks and their impact is critical 
for the stakeholders of a blockchain business 
ecosystem to accurately evaluate the potential risks and 
benefits. From a theoretical standpoint, forks are 
complex in nature, and often associated with 
contradictory sociotechnical interactions such as 
network attacks, community disagreements, and 
market confusion and uncertainties. Thus, as a first 
step towards understanding the forks, research is 
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necessary to investigate the actors involved in the 
blockchain ecosystem. 
As a result, this study investigates what are the 
focal actors and how does their heterogeneity manifest 
itself in blockchain splits? We build on Actor-Network 
Theory (ANT) [3, 15] as the theoretical foundation of 
the study, and use the literature on OSS forks and 
community splits [10, 25, 29] as our point of departure. 
We employ case study methodology [8, 38] and collect 
data from online sources and in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with Bitcoin community members, namely 
miners, developers, and investors. Our study 
contributes to the nascent IS literature on blockchain 
[23] as well as the research on OSS forks [10, 25, 29], 
providing a theoretically grounded empirical analysis 
of the actors involved in blockchain forks.  
 
2. Blockchain fork 
 
A blockchain fork refers to a change of rules that 
separates the blockchain into two or more potential 
paths [26]. There are three kinds of blockchain fork, 
namely, soft-fork, hard-fork, and user-activated soft-
fork [32]. A soft-fork is a backward compatible 
software upgrade that splits the blockchain 
temporarily. During the soft-fork process, the original 
chain accepts blocks from both non-upgraded and 
upgraded nodes. The forked chain would contain 
blocks only from upgraded nodes. The upgraded nodes 
must reach a consensus and gain a certain percentage 
of the network processing power within a time limit, 
otherwise the soft-fork fails and the original chain 
continues. If the consensus is reached, the new rules 
are implemented in the network. All nodes need to 
upgrade or will be mining unrecognized blocks. 
Bitcoin’s BIP 66 (signature validation) and P2SH 
(address formatting) are examples of soft-forks.  
A hard-fork is not backward compatible and 
permanently creates two separate blockchains. Both 
chains run in parallel but with a different set of rules. 
Hard-forks are executed to handle acute issues such as 
increasing block size, serious network abuse, and theft. 
For example, BCH was created as the result of a hard-
fork from Bitcoin to increase block size. ETH and ETC 
were created from Ethereum as the result of a hard-
fork.  
Finally, a user-activated soft-fork is the 
controversial concept of upgrading a blockchain 
without the support of those who provide the network 
processing power. Instead of relying on achieving the 
threshold power for the fork, the user-activated soft-
fork relies on the economic majority of the ecosystem. 
BIP 148 is an example of a user-activated soft-fork on 
the Bitcoin network, which took place between 
midnight 1 August 2017 and midnight 15 November 
2017.  
Blockchain forks are widely discussed in the news. 
However, to date, there is little academic research on 
blockchain forks [6]. As blockchain projects are open 
source, we conducted a literature review on open 
source project forks. A few prior studies focused on 
forks in the OSS context. Table 1 summarizes these 
studies.  
 
Table 1. Summary of prior research on OSS forks 
Study Research Method Theory  Key Findings 
Rastogi & 
Nagappan [29] 
Statistical analysis on 2217 projects 
from GitHub 
None One in every five projects observes a decline in the 
sustainability of community participation after a fork 
Gamalielsson 
& Lundell 
[10] 
Data from LibreOffice community 
after a fork from OpenOffice.org. 
The data include log data and 12 
interviews  
None LibreOffice community sustainable and no sign of project 
stagnation even 33 months after the fork. Perceived by its 
community as supportive, diversified, and independent  
Nyman et al. 
[26] 
Theoretical  None Fork ensures the code remains open, and the code that 
best serves the community lives on. The fork provides a 
mechanism to safeguard against despotic decisions by the 
project lead 
Robles & 
Gonzalez-
Brahona [30] 
In-depth analysis of 220 forks None Forks occur in every software domain. They have 
become more frequent in recent years, and very few 
merge with the original project 
Viseur [34] 26 forks in open source projects None 42% of forks were motivated by technical specialization. 
In 54% of the cases studied, both the fork and original 
projects survived 
The literature review presented in Table 1 drew two 
interesting observations. First, most of the research on 
OSS forks investigates the survival of the original and 
forked projects after the split. The survival and 
community sustainability of the forked as well as 
original projects is not self-evident. In some cases, 
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both the fork and the original project survive and 
secure community support. Second, most studies on 
OSS forks lack the application of theory, which 
inevitably limits the theoretical contribution. We argue 
that the actors (and their network) involved in the 
project are critical to the survival of the blockchain 
project. Thus, research applying a solid theoretical 
foundation to identify the actors and examine the 
underlying network can significantly extend the current 
understanding of why blockchains fork.  
While the blockchain literature has started to 
burgeon, there is little research theorizing on 
blockchain evolution. Mostly, the extant literature is 
based on a selected technology focus [39], or debating 
the dark side of blockchain such as enabling 
anonymous actors to cover their illegal trades [12]. Our 
focus in this paper is to understand the different actors 
and their contradictory roles in developing Bitcoin 
forks, and their further contribution to the Bitcoin 
evolution.  
 
3. An Actor-Network perspective on 
blockchain splits 
 
We employ ANT [3, 5, 15] as the theoretical 
foundation to study Bitcoin splits. ANT provides a 
sociotechnical perspective [18] to analyze the complex 
interactions between technology and human processes 
[2, 20], which is pertinent in the context of Bitcoin. 
ANT does not distinguish between human and non-
human actors [17]. In fact, it places a higher emphasis 
on non-human actors, enabling the investigation of the 
role of technology, for instance [14]. Furthermore, 
ANT does not distinguish between micro (individual) 
and macro (group of individuals or organizational) 
actors in advance [5, 19]. This allows researchers to 
consider the sociotechnical collective as a single actor 
or group of actors, depending on the level of analysis 
[5].  
The ANT literature describes how heterogeneous 
networks are created by a number of actors that can be 
human or non-human [5, 27]. An actor is defined as 
“any element which bends space around itself, makes 
other elements dependent upon itself and translates 
their will into the language of its own” [5: p. 286]. 
Actors include, for example, both social and technical 
elements, such as individuals, a group of individuals, 
organizations, ideologies, methodologies, concepts, 
hardware, software, and other technical artifacts or a 
part of any of them [17].  
Accordingly, any actor, whether an individual, 
object, or organization, is equally important in creating 
a network [17]. The fundamental goal of the ANT is to 
explore how networks are built or assembled by the 
actors to reach a certain objective [14]. ANT has been 
widely applied in IS research to understand the 
complex social interactions with IT as well as 
processes associated with IT implementations [31]. 
Consequently, we apply ANT in the blockchain 
domain to interpret the complex social processes 
associated with Bitcoin forks. 
We rely on a number of concepts that guide us in 
interpreting the complex processes associated with 
blockchain forks. As stated, ANT emphasizes the 
network and assumes nothing lies outside of it. Thus, 
each actor can be defined and understood only in 
relation to other actors in the network [19]. This 
implies any actor can be considered a sum of smaller 
actors. For example, a computer is a complex system (a 
network) containing many electronic elements (actors), 
which are hidden from the user, who simply uses the 
computer as a single object (actor). This simplification 
is known as punctualization [4: p. 153], and allows a 
researcher to understand a network at different levels 
of complexity or granularity depending on the research 
objective.  
In this paper, we view and explain blockchain splits 
as a translation process of ANT, one that creates “a 
temporary social order, or movement from one order to 
another, through changes in the alignment of interests 
in a network” [31: p. 54]. There are four phases or 
moments in translation, namely problematization, 
interessement, enrollment, and mobilization [3]. In 
problematization, the focal actor, that is the key actor 
behind the process of gathering other actors’ support 
for a change initiative, defines the problem, identifies 
relevant actors, explains how the problem affects those 
actors, and outlines strategies to address the problem.  
The focal actor establishes itself as an obligatory 
passage point (OPP) between the other actors and the 
network to render itself “indispensable” [3]. OPP refers 
to the process of forming a shared focus among the 
relevant actors to successfully pursue the interest. The 
second phase of translation is interessement, which 
involves convincing other actors through negotiation to 
have interest that is aligned with the focal actor. 
Incentives can be given to the other actors so that they 
pass through the OPP and align their interest with the 
focal actor [31].  
Successful interessement is followed by enrollment, 
which involves defining the roles of each actor in the 
transformed or newly created actor-network. As a part 
of the enrollment process, the commitments of 
enrollment can be recorded in a shared memory 
through inscription. In general, “an inscription is the 
result of the translation of one’s interest into material 
form” [4]. It should be noted that enrollment is 
temporary; betrayal by enrolled actors (failing to act as 
promised), is a possibility. On the other hand, if actors 
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enrolled in the network adequately represent the 
masses, enrollment manifests as active support, and 
mobilization occurs. 
 
4. Methodology  
 
We employed case study methodology [8, 38] to 
investigate blockchain forks, adopting a single case 
approach [21, 38] and focusing specifically on Bitcoin. 
We chose Bitcoin because it was the first blockchain-
based application, and has undergone a number of 
forks since its introduction in 2009. These events have 
attracted considerable attention on traditional as well as 
social media, thereby enabling us to collect rich data 
from several sources, including online discussions.  
The single-case approach is suitable when the case 
is particularly exemplary [38] and examined over time 
[21]. Bitcoin can be considered an exemplary case 
[38], since cryptocurrencies are an important 
application of blockchain technology and Bitcoin is the 
most valuable and widely used cryptocurrency. 
Second, with respect to the longitudinal nature of the 
phenomenon under investigation [21], a blockchain 
essentially contains a record of past events, and 
meticulously describing blockchain splits requires 
examining the events preceding the split.  
As is typical in case study research, the empirical 
data were collected from multiple sources [38], in this 
instance between November 2017 and June 2018. We 
first extracted secondary data on Bitcoin forks from 
coindesk.com, a cryptocurrency-focused online news 
source, and from bitcointalk.com, a Bitcoin- and 
cryptocurrency-focused discussion forum using the 
search keyword “fork”. Thereafter, we conducted five 
in-depth, semi-structured interviews among Bitcoin 
community members, including developers, miners, 
and investors, to understand the fork as a process from 
different actors’ vantage points. The interviewees were 
recruited using a snowball approach, and all were men. 
The interviews lasted from 30 to 90 minutes, and all 
authors were present at the interviews. 
The data were analyzed in accordance with the 
interpretative actor-network lens [9, 19]. This included 
several rounds to make sense of the sociotechnical 
mess [19] of actors’ obvious and hidden traces in the 
collected data. The mess is problematic for the 
researcher, as it makes it difficult to comb the data into 
clear categories. As a part of the interpretive analysis, 
we conducted several iterative sketches in 
understanding the micro and macro actor constellations 
and their motives.  
 
5. Case description  
 
Bitcoin was the first application developed on 
blockchain technology [11]. Common belief is that 
Bitcoin was invented by an unknown person or group 
of persons under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto 
[24]. The genesis block of Bitcoin emerged in January 
2009.  
Bitcoin was developed as a decentralized digital 
currency to revolutionize the traditional intermediary-
based financial industry. At this time, Bitcoin 
continues to be developed and maintained as an open 
source project by a community. Thus, the community 
members decide the stages of Bitcoin evolution. 
However, the basic set of rules and functions allowed 
in Bitcoin could not be changed without changing the 
source code considerably.  
In principal, blockchain-based applications such as 
Bitcoin evolve by actor negotiation. A major change in 
Bitcoin’s source code requires sufficient support from 
the community. Such changes may lead to member 
disagreement and trigger splits in the original network. 
Once a split occurs, the two resulting blockchains 
become incompatible with each other, and the one that 
attracts enough community members survives.  
Since Bitcoin’s inception in 2009, there have been 
two coin splits, namely Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin Gold, 
although there have been several instances of major 
changes (or hard forks) to the Bitcoin core client. 
Notable changes include Bitcoin XT, Bitcoin 
Unlimited, and Bitcoin classic. A timeline of the 
Bitcoin hard forks is presented in Figure 1. 
An update to the Bitcoin source code or protocol 
requires that Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIPs) 
are submitted by an individual or group of individuals 
in the Bitcoin community (mostly developers). The 
team maintaining the Bitcoin core reviews the proposal 
with the community, and looks for general approval. If 
the community signals approval, the update is pushed 
to the next version of the Bitcoin core. Next, it is up to 
the miners whether or not they run the updated client. 
If they decide not to run it, the update fails. Thus, with 
respect to Bitcoin, miners are very important members 
of the community and play a key role in splits. 
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Figure 2. Timeline of major events in Bitcoin history 
6. Understanding Bitcoin splits through 
the lens of ANT  
 
According to ANT, all components of a network, 
such as objects, ideas, processes, and any other 
relevant factors, are considered as important as 
humans in creating social situations [5, 18]. An actor-
network, i.e. assemblage [11], is a moving entity 
whose articulations produce effects, leaving traces of 
its passage in the form of rigid and fluid structures 
and relationships [2, 14]. The choice of ANT as our 
theoretical foundation has some specific assets in 
terms of explaining how complex things change. 
First, the focus is on the network and constant flux of 
relations - instead of counting and categorizing of 
end states or things – which helps us keep an eye on 
the shifts of relations in the various contexts and the 
diverse roles of players. For instance, categorizing 
complex phenomena may lead to prematurely 
ignoring significant aspects. Second, according to 
ANT, the network [13] is all that exists; nothing 
exists outside the network of relations, also known as 
flat ontology. Consequently, even researchers, such 
as the three authors of this paper, while trying to 
understand Bitcoin forks are part of the network, as 
we direct our intellectual inquiry to Bitcoin, which 
could influence other actors. With the ANT lens, we 
join the interpretive research tradition in qualitative 
IS research [35, 36, 38]. 
 
6.1. Actors and the network 
 
We identified eight types of focal actor in the 
Bitcoin network that can influence a split: the 
blockchain, miners, core developers, 
exchange/marketplace owners, investors, merchants, 
hardware manufacturers, and wallets. These can be 
micro level actors such as humans, technology 
(including code scripts) or ideologies, and the diverse 
interests of individuals; and at the macro level, 
institutions, companies, banks, regulators, and tax 
authorities, amongst others.  
The first actor is Bitcoin blockchain, which 
defines the set of rules through algorithms. The 
algorithm also reflects the ideological foundations of 
Bitcoin, such as decentralization, democracy and 
anonymity.  
Miners range from individuals with limited 
computing power to large companies with 
considerable computing power at their disposal. 
Bitcoin mining is a competitive and risky endeavor. 
Miners need to wait very long periods to confirm a 
block and receive the reward for identifying the 
block. To reduce revenue variance, miners join 
mining pools and bundle together their computing 
power. Revenues depend on the amount of work the 
miner contributed to finding the block. As noted 
earlier, miners are powerful and important actors in 
the network, since the continuation of the blockchain 
depends on them. Mining pools may have informal 
voting mechanisms about which version of the coin 
to mine. 
Bitcoin core developers are those who develop 
the Bitcoin source code. As Bitcoin is an open source 
project, anyone with sufficient programming skills 
can become a developer to contribute to the source 
code. However, approval is needed to become a core 
developer. As described earlier, updates to the 
Bitcoin protocol are developed as BIPs, and 
submitted for review to the approval community. 
Thus, Bitcoin core developers are also powerful 
actors in the network who can contribute to split. 
Exchange/marketplace owners provide the 
marketplace to connect Bitcoin buyers and sellers. 
They are also important actors that may trigger splits 
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indirectly. The marketplaces make it easy to buy and 
sell Bitcoin in real money. They may play an 
important role in a split by supporting and including 
the forked coin in their marketplace. Such 
information can be used to promote the newly created 
coin among investors. If the exchange supports a 
split, the traders generally receive an equivalent 
amount of new coin (known as “air drop”) after the 
split. If the split is not supported, customers are not 
awarded the new coin. 
Investors, particularly large institutional investors, 
are also important in split decisions, as they can 
manipulate the price of Bitcoin. 
Merchants are those who adopt Bitcoin as a 
payment method in their business. They typically 
need a fast and secure payment system or want to 
differentiate themselves from competitors by 
providing the option to pay with Bitcoin. While 
Bitcoin may be seen as a secure payment method, it 
is often slow due to scalability issues. Thus, 
merchants may not adopt Bitcoin as a payment 
method, which may in turn trigger a split in Bitcoin to 
make it faster. 
Mining hardware manufacturers produce the 
specialized hardware to mine Bitcoin. At the 
beginning, CPU- based mining was possible for 
Bitcoin. As time passed, the complexity of mining 
algorithm increased and even GPU-based mining 
become impossible. Today, specialized ASIC miners 
are needed for mining due to high complexity.  
Finally, a wallet is the software or app where 
people keep their Bitcoins. Wallets include desktop 
wallets, mobile wallets, and hardware wallets. 
Wallets allow consumers pay Bitcoin for their 
purchases. Thus, they play an important role in wider 
adoption of Bitcoin.  
Table 2. illustrates the various actors and their 
heterogeneity from social, technological, and 
economic dimensions in the Bitcoin community. For 
example, from social dimension point of view, 
miners can be individuals or even organizations and 
they may become part of a mining pool and 
collaborate with each other for mining. From 
technological point of view, the miners need to own 
computers, applications, cooling hardware, and 
electricity for mining. Finally, from the economic 
point of view, the miners want to earn money from 
mining.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that the actors 
might play multiple roles in the network. For 
example, an individual can be a developer, miner, 
and investor. A mining hardware manufacturer 
produces and sells the equipment but also acts as a 
miner. These all reflect the heterogeneity of the 
involved actors in the Bitcoin ecosystem.
Table 2. Illustration of heterogeneity of actors 
Actor type Identified heterogeneity of actor types 
Social Technology Economic 
Blockchain Ideologies, motivations, 
collaboration, competition 
Algorithms, Internet, computing 
power, electricity, storage space 
Incentives  
Miners  Individual miners, mining pools, 
interactions and collaborations within 
community  
Computers, computer programs, 
electricity, cooling hardware, web-
based applications 
Money 
Bitcoin core 
developers  
Individual developers, groups and 
networks of developers, developer 
societies 
Computers, programs, education 
forums on the web 
Employment, asset 
ownership 
Exchanges/ 
Marketplaces  
Individual company, network of 
companies 
Technology for trading Information, trading 
volume 
Investors  Individual investors, institutional 
investors 
Technology for trading Money 
Merchants  Individual merchants, retailers, 
wholesalers 
Technological infrastructure for 
payment systems 
Payment processing fees, 
processing speed 
Hardware 
manufacturer 
Individual manufacturer, networks 
of manufacturers 
Mining algorithms, specialized 
hardware for mining (e.g., ASIC) 
Money, amount and price 
of hardware sold 
Wallets Consumers, merchants  Desktops, mobile devices including 
software and hardware technology, 
security  
Revenue model 
 
6.2. The fork as a translation process 
 
First, we describe problematization in the Bitcoin 
case. Bitcoin suffers from a scalability problem due 
to its wider adoption. In short, as the currency grows, 
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so does the number of transactions. Thus, the one-
megabyte block size limit became a bottleneck, with 
transactions waiting a long time for confirmation. 
During the worst periods of these performance issues 
in January-February 2018, the average transaction 
processing times exceeded 10,000 minutes1, 
obviously limiting the currency’s commercial use.  
As Bitcoin is open-source, anyone can put 
forward proposals for improvement. For example, in 
order to solve the scalability issue, two possible (and 
opposing) paths were identified. Bitcoin core-
developers were the focal actors for the first path, and 
their proposal was to allow some data to be moved 
outside of the main network, creating multiple 
ledgers or side chains. This is known as Segregated 
Witness (SegWit). Some miners viewed activating 
SegWit without increasing the block size would not 
help and is just a temporary solution to the scalability 
problem. Although many developers were against 
increasing the block size, a significant portion of the 
Bitcoin community decided to increase the block size 
to two megabyte (this is known as SegWit2x). This 
can be seen as enrollment in the ANT terminology. 
However, SegWit2x ultimately failed to find 
consensus among the community and core 
developers. This reflects what ANT refers to as 
betrayal. 
Another competing solution was simply to 
increase block size to accommodate more 
transactions per block. The focal actors were 
Bitmain, an ASIC Bitcoin mining hardware 
manufacturer, and its mining pool. They established 
themselves as the OPP by promising mining support 
(interessement). Thus, some developers also took 
interest in the option (enrollment). In addition, this 
group of the community believed that SegWit2x 
might eventually fail or at least would not be 
executed in the near future. Thus, the community 
decided to split and make the new coin, BCH (i.e., 
mobilization occurred). 
The Bitcoin gold split unfolded in a different way. 
While BCH was created to tackle Bitcoin’s 
scalability problem, Bitcoin Gold aimed to mitigate 
the increasing centralization of the Bitcoin mining 
industry. As described earlier, Bitcoin mining has 
become increasingly processor-heavy, and custom-
built ASICs are a popular solution. Bitcoin mining 
became an industry, where the leading companies 
accounted for a huge amount of network processing 
power. As shown in Table 3, just a few big mining 
players hold the majority of that power. Thus, a 
                                                
1 (https://blockchain.info/charts/avg-confirmation-time, 
accessed on 15 June, 2018 at GMT 13:24) 
 
developer team became the focal actor and 
introduced an alternative mining algorithm 
(equihash), which is suitable for GPUs, and they 
claimed that creating Bitcoin gold made mining 
democratic again. 
 
Table 3. Computing power distribution among 
mining pools 
Mining pool Computing 
power % 
Progressive  
%	  
BTC.Com 26.7 26.7	  
AntPool 12.9 39.6	  
SlushPool 12.0 51.6	  
ViaBTC 11.7 63.3	  
Unknown 9.0 72.3	  
BTCTOP 8.4 80.7	  
F2Pool 7.2 87.9	  
BTCC Pool 3.1 91.1	  
BW.com 2.2 93.3	  
BitFury 1.5 94.8	  
BitClub Network 1.5 96.3	  
58COIN 1.2 97.5	  
GBMiners 1.0 98.5	  
Bitcoin.com 0.7 99.2	  
KanoPool 0.3 99.5	  
ConnectBTC 0.2 99.7	  
BitcoinRussia 0.2 99.9	  
Total 100.0 ~100	  
 
Source: https://blockchain.info/pools, accessed on June 15, 2018 
at GMT 13:00 
 
7.1. Key findings 
 
We highlight three main findings from the study. The 
first relates to actor heterogeneity. We found that 
each actor type includes heterogeneous features, 
which could be classified into three broad categories: 
social, technological, and economic. Our findings 
show the Bitcoin actor-network comprises key non-
human actors such as the blockchain itself and 
wallets. Other non-human actors, such as technology 
(e.g. code, algorithm, electricity), as well as 
institutions (regulators, central banks, global financial 
system) and ideologies (e.g. an inclusive and 
democratic global payment system) influence the 
split process as embedded in the focal actors. 
Our second key finding focuses on the role of 
actor heterogeneity, particularly related to the 
translation process. We observed that many of the 
actors involved in the process could have both a 
micro and macro nature. For example, a miner can be 
an individual (micro actor) as well as a mining pool 
(macro actor). We also observed there is a constant 
flux between micro and macro positions, as 
individual miners aggregate their resources and form 
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mining pools. Furthermore, certain mining companies 
have become heavily involved in hardware 
manufacturing. By moving into a macro actor 
position they can exert considerable power in the 
network. Altogether, Bitcoin mining has become an 
oligopolistic market, dominated by a small number of 
large mining companies. As a result, miners without 
ASIC technology and/or affordable electricity at their 
disposal have largely abandoned Bitcoin. 
The third key finding relates to the dynamic 
nature of the non-human actors, as ideologies may 
contribute to a blockchain split. For example, one 
interviewed miner reported he had engaged in mining 
primarily due to intellectual curiosity in the 
technology, but had lost much of his interest due to 
the shift to ASIC mining. Similarly, a blockchain 
entrepreneur said the hype around Bitcoin has had a 
profound influence on the community dynamics, as 
economic interests and incentives have overridden 
idealism.  
 
7.2. Contributions 
 
Our study extends the current literature in three 
specific areas. First, in its principal area of 
contribution, the study advances the understanding of 
blockchain forks by elaborating on the actors 
involved and their heterogeneity in a cryptocurrency 
context. To this end, our results suggest the actors in 
Bitcoin forks are considerably more heterogeneous 
and their networks more complex than has been 
reported in the prior literature on OSS forks [10, 25, 
29]. We identified eight types of actor involved in 
Bitcoin forks. We have further elaborated on their 
behavior in micro and macro settings for negotiations 
related to forking the blockchain. Moreover, our 
findings highlight the fluidity of actors’ roles prior to, 
during and after the blockchain split. We believe the 
actor types that we found in this study are generic in 
nature and thus are applicable for other 
cryptocurrencies such as Ethereum. Furthermore, we 
believe a similar approach can be followed to 
investigate OSS forks to identify communalities and 
differences with blockchain forks. 
Second, pertaining to a more theoretical sphere, 
the present study adds to the current ANT research 
focusing on blockchain [6, 33, 37]. To this end, our 
findings increase the understanding of the role and 
constant fluid constellation of the blockchain 
network, caused by actor heterogeneity. Moreover, in 
analyzing their heterogeneity, we provide a fine-
grained account of the actors involved in blockchain 
forks. As our specific contribution to the ANT 
literature [6, 33], we have described how the micro 
actors engage with, and even fuse with, other micro 
and macro actors, and elaborated on the 
consequences of these fusions. They are poorly 
understood theoretically as well as in practice due to 
their complex nature. For instance, rather than 
considering blockchain as a single technology, ANT 
provides specific assets to understand blockchain as a 
network of heterogeneous agents with diverse ends.  
Third, our findings advance the understanding of 
cryptocurrencies as actor-networks. Our analysis 
revealed the actor-network involved in Bitcoin forks 
comprises not only human but also non-human actors 
and interplay between the two. For example, the 
constantly increasing algorithmic complexity in 
Bitcoin mining requires significant amounts of 
computing power and electricity. This has led to a 
situation where institutional miners with significant 
financial investment acquired the required computing 
power and now dominate Bitcoin mining (see Table 
3). This, in turn, fundamentally questions the open, 
decentralized nature and ideology underlying Bitcoin.  
In sum, the study contributes to the discussion on 
the roles and interplay of human and non-human 
elements of information systems [e.g. 1, 21, 31]. 
Furthermore, we ask to what extent agency could and 
should be attributed to non-human actors [28], and 
what are the potential consequences of non-human 
agency. From a broader perspective, our study 
contributes to growing the discussion on interplay 
and power relations between technology and humans 
[7, 16, 22].  
 
7.3. Limitations and future research 
 
The study has a number of limitations. First, the 
empirical research focused solely on Bitcoin forks. 
However, we hold that the actors and the nature of 
their heterogeneity identified in Bitcoin, provide 
meaningful insights into other cryptocurrencies (e.g. 
Ethereum), where mining and miners play a key role. 
Nevertheless, there are also cryptocurrencies such as 
Ripple (XRP) that have been pre-mined by the 
developer team. This implies the applicability of our 
findings to other contexts and instances of blockchain 
forks requires additional research. Thus, we suggest 
future research could extend the scope of empirical 
investigation to other instances of blockchain forks, 
to specifically focus on investigating the potential 
commonalities and differences between blockchains.  
Second, our study comprises empirical data from 
two online sources and five interviews. Yet, the aim 
of the study was to address a new theoretical opening 
in decentralized technologies, so obtaining additional 
empirical data is essential to reinforce the 
trustworthiness of the interpretations.  
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Third, the choice of theoretical lens obviously has 
a profound influence on the interpretations drawn 
from the empirical data. For the present study, we 
adopted specific elements of ANT as our theoretical 
lens. In order to obtain different perspectives and 
interpretations of blockchain forks, we suggest 
additional research should scrutinize the advantages 
and disadvantages of different theoretical lenses in 
understanding blockchain splits.  
. 
9. References  
 
[1] Benbasat, I., and R.W. Zmud, “The Identity Crisis 
Within the IS Discipline: Defining and Communicating the 
Discipline’s Core Properties,” MIS Quarterly, 2003, 27 (2), 
pp. 183-194. 
 
[2] Bijker, W.E., T.P. Hughes, T. Pinch, and D.G. Douglas, 
The social construction of technological systems: New 
directions in the sociology and history of technology, MIT 
Press, Boston, MA, 2012. 
 
[3] Callon, M, “Some elements of a sociology of 
translation: Domestication of the scallops and the 
fishermen of St Brieux Bay”. In J. Law (ed.), Power, 
Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge. 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1986, pp. 197–225. 
 
[4] Callon, M, “Techno-economic networks and 
irreversibility.” In J. Law (ed.), A sociology of monsters. 
Essays on power, technology and domination, Routledge, 
London, 1991, pp. 132-161. 
 
[5] Callon, M., and E. Latour, “Unscrewing the big 
leviathan: How actors macro-structure reality and how 
sociologists help them to do so.” In K.D. Knorr-Cetina and 
A.V. Cicourel (eds.), Advances in Social Theory and 
Methodology: Towards an Integration of Micro and Macro 
Sociologies. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981, pp. 
277–303. 
 
[6] De Filippi, P, and B. Loveluck, “The Invisible Politics 
of Bitcoin: Governance Crisis of a Decentralized 
Infrastructure.” Internet Policy Review, 2016, 5 (4) pp. 1-
28. 
 
[7] DuPont, Q, Experiments in algorithmic governance: A 
history and ethnography of “The DAO,” a failed 
decentralized autonomous organization, Bitcoin and 
Beyond, Routledge, London, 2017, pp. 157-177. 
 
[8] Eisenhardt, K. M, “Building theories from case study 
research,” Academy of Management Review, 1989, 14 (4), 
pp. 532-550. 
 
[9] Freeman, M, Modes of thinking for qualitative data 
analysis, Routledge, New York, NY, 2017. 
 
[10] Gamalielsson, J., and B. Lundell, “Sustainability of 
open source software communities beyond fork: How and 
why has the LibreOffice project evolved?” Journal of 
Systems and Software, 2014, 89, pp.128-145. 
 
[11] Iansiti, M., and K.R. Lakhani, “The Truth about 
blockchain”, Harvard Business Review, 2017, 95 (1) pp. 
118-127. 
 
[12] Kow, Y. M., and C. Lustig, "Imaginaries and 
Crystallization Processes in Bitcoin Infrastructuring," 
Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW), 2017, 
pp. 1-24. 
 
[13] Latour, B, “On actor-network theory: A few 
clarifications,” Soziale Welt, 1996, 47 (4), pp. 369-381. 
 
[14] Latour, B, Reassembling the social: An introduction to 
actor-network-theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2005. 
 
[15] Latour, B, Science in action: How to follow scientists 
and engineers through society, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1987. 
 
[16] Latour, B, “Some experiments in art and politics,“ In: 
Aranda J, Wood BK, Vidokle A (eds) The Internet does not 
exist—e-flux Journal, Sternberg Press, Berlin, 2015, pp. 
40–53. 
 
[17] Latour, B, Technology is society made durable, A 
Sociology of Monsters. Essays on Power, Technology and 
Domination, Law, J. (Ed), Routledge, London, 1991, pp. 
103-131. 
 
[18] Latour, B, “The Powers of Association. Power, Action 
and Belief. A new sociology of knowledge?” Sociological 
Review Monograph 32, Law, J. (Ed), Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, London, 1986, pp. 264-280. 
 
[19] Law, J, After method: Mess in social science research, 
Routledge, New York, NY, 2004. 
 
[20] Law, J, “Notes on the theory of the actor-network: 
Ordering, strategy, and heterogeneity”, Systems Practice, 
1992, 5 (4) pp. 379-393. 
 
[21] Leonard-Barton, D, “A dual methodology for case 
studies: Synergistic use of a longitudinal single site with 
replicated multiple sites,” Organization Science, 1990, 1(3), 
pp. 248-266. 
 
[22] Leonardi, P. M., and S.R. Barley, “Materiality and 
Change: Challenges to Building Better Theory about 
Technology and Organizing,” Information and 
Organization, 2008, (18), pp. 159-176. 
 
[23] Lindman, J., V. K. Tuunainen, and M. Rossi, 
“Opportunities and risks of blockchain technologies - A 
research agenda,” In Proceedings of the 50tth Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) 
2017. 
 
Page 4603
[24] Nakamoto, S, Bitcoin, A peer-to-peer electronic cash 
system, https://Bitcoin.org/Bitcoin.pdf Retrieved April, 20, 
2018. 
 
[25] Nyman, L., and J. Lindman, J, “Code forking, 
governance, and sustainability in open source software,” 
Technology Innovation Management Review, January 
2013, 7-12. 
 
[26] Nyman, L., T. Mikkonen, J. Lindman, and M. 
Fougere, “Perspective of code forking and sustainability in 
open source software,” In Hammouda, I., Lundell, B., 
Mikkonen, T., and Scacchi, W. (eds.), Open Source 
Systems: Long-term sustainability, Proc. 8th IFIP WG 2.3 
International Conference, OSS, 2012, 378, pp. 274-279. 
 
[27] Orlikowski, W. J, The sociomateriality of 
organisational life: considering technology in management 
research, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2009, 34 (1), 
pp. 125-141. 
 
[28] Pickering, A, “The Mangle of Practice: Agency and 
Emergence in the Sociology of Science,” American Journal 
of Sociology, 1993, 99 (3), pp. 559-589.  
 
[29] Rastogi, A., and N. Nagappan, “Forking and the 
sustainability of the developer community participation – 
An empirical investigation on outcomes and reason,” In 
IEEE International Conference on Software Analysis, 
Evolution, and Reengineering, Suita, Japan, 2016.  
 
[30] Robles, G., and J. Gonzalez-Barahona, “A 
comprehensive study of software forks: Dates, reasons, and 
outcomes,” In Proceedings of the 8th IFIP WG 2.13 
International Conference, Hammamet, Tunisia, 2012. 
 
[31] Sarker, S., S. Sarker, and A. Sidorova, “Understanding 
business process change failure: An actor-network 
perspective.” Journal of Management Information Systems, 
2006, 23 (1), pp. 51-86. 
 
[32] Severeijns, L,“What is blockchain? How is it going to 
affect Business?” 2017, Available at 
https://beta.vu.nl/nl/Images/werkstuk-severeijns_tcm235-
869851.pdf 
[33] Venturini, T., D. Ricci, M. Mauri, L. Kimbell and A. 
Meunier, “A, Designing Controversies and Their Publics,” 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press (MIT Press), 
Design Issues, 2015, 31 (3), pp. 74 - 87. 
[34] Viseur, R, “Forks impacts and motivations in free and 
open source projects,” International Journal of Advanced 
Computer Science and Applications, 2012, 3 (2), pp. 117-
122. 
 
[35] Walsham, G, “Doing interpretive research,” European 
journal of information systems, 2006, 15(3), pp. 320-330. 
 
[36] Walsham, G, “Interpretive case studies in IS research: 
Nature and method,” European Journal of Information 
Systems, 1995, 4 (2), pp. 74–81. 
 
[37] Wright, A. and P. De Filippi, “Decentralized 
Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex 
Cryptographia” (March 10, 2015), Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2580664 or http://dx.doi.o
rg/10.2139/ssrn.2580664 
 
[38] Yin, R. K, Case study research and applications: 
Design and methods, 6th ed., Sage publications, London, 
2018. 
 
[39] Yli-Huumo, J., D. Ko, S. Choi, S. Park, and K. 
Smolander, “Where is current research on blockchain 
technology?—a systematic review,” PloS ONE, 2016, 
11(10), pp. 1-27. 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 4604
